i recommend this. It's a youtube series that has an 8-10 minute that matches up the videos with the weeks. (Sept. 4 is one video, Sept. 11 is the next video, etc.). It covers WW1. There's also other videos about the different countries, war techniques, etc.
"They Shall Not Grow Old" - WW1 documentary by Peter Jackson
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i recommend this. It's a youtube series that has an 8-10 minute that matches up the videos with the weeks. (Sept. 4 is one video, Sept. 11 is the next video, etc.). It covers WW1. There's also other videos about the different countries, war techniques, etc.
My grandfather was a WWI veteran who was on a ship when the Armistice was signed. Got to France and the boat turned around and came back. I went to the KC WWI Museum last summer and toured the displays and visited the archives to get more information. They had no record of his service, so I sent them copies of his draft notice, his induction and service discharge papers, and some of his personnel papers. He had kept some things that they had never seen, so if you have anything pertaining to your relatives service let them know. The National WWI Museum and Memorial 2 Memorial Drive, Kansas City, MO 64108
I went last night as well. Pretty cool experience. The weirdest part to me was the
interaction of with the German captured soldiers. If they weren't wearing uniforms you'd swear they were all on the same side, just hanging out.
@herbicide
Stepping back from this for a few days but glad to return to it now.
I think our back and forth, which I did enjoy immensely, missed kind of my overall point that kicked off the conversation in the first place -- while we talked about the initial German thrust to Paris in 1914, most of our "what if" scenarios about the Great War concern 1917 and the German Spring Offensive of 1918. These were comparatively late in the war, which prompted my comment about it being a game that came down to the wire and, therefore, in its morbid way, a more interesting one than the World War, which was over early in its course.
The World War was, again, basically over by the end of 1942 with the destruction of the German Eight Army in Stalingrad, Rommel being stopped in his tracks at El Alamein with the landings for Operation Torch behind him, and the destruction of the cream of the Japanese carrier forces at the Battle of Midway that summer. Your point about the German failure to take Moscow in late 1941 only adds to my point -- your point that the failure to take Moscow was a major turning point of the war (and it was) furthers my point that the World War was over early. I have never seen anybody make even a reasonable case the Allies were worried about losing the war in spring 1945 the way they were in 1918. Things were very touch-and-go for them that spring.
Going through the points if there is something relevant to add...
(1.) I do not know how one can say the Germans did not win on the Eastern Front, defeating the Romanov regime and its successors in the process. They did this against a foe with massive numbers while needing to hold on the Western Front and help out their various incompetent allies throughout the rest of Europe. The fact Imperial Russia was a vulnerable target, full of internal instability and strife, is irrelevant. The Germans forced them out.
I would probably argue the Soviet Union in 1941 was more of a basket case (after Stalin's purges, the various show trials, force collectivization, millions dying in famines, barely able to defeat little Finland, countless political exiles, international pariah, etc.) than the Czarist regime in 1914. Stalin got his act together far better than Nicolas did, though, but I doubt you would argue that Soviet weakness in the early part of the war makes your "near victory" for them, had Germany shown more focus to take Leningrad and Moscow, any less an accomplishment.
(2.) I know this is rah-rah stuff from a commander, but every source that I have seen said the Allies were gravely worried in April 1918 about the Germans...
April 1918 is a lot closer to the end of the war than, say, November 1942 and Stalingrad.
(3.) I think the U-Boat question (in WWII) is an interesting one we cannot resolve. I just know Hitler's thoughts (and their naval leaderships' desires and intended strategies) in declaring war on the United States. Hitler rightfully knew the centerpiece of the war was the Eastern Front. Victory there would divide the planet between German and Anglo-American spheres, and even if Fortress Britain stood, there was no practical way to reconquer Europe once the Nazis have a chance to wheel and consolidate their empire, hunkering down for a long Cold War.
Unless you bring nuclear weapons into it... Not going there.
The Red Army with American supplies is more like the Red Army we know. It has trucks and fuel to move supplies, equipment, and men around. Those men are better fed and clothed, much more able to fight and move in the winter. Their officers have radios and telegraphs to communicate and coordinate with each other, and their railroad system has functioning engines and cars to move supplies on a strategic level. Without Lend-Lease, the Red Army is much more like the Russian army of the last war. It might be massive, but it is less able to fight a modern, mobile war. The Wehrmacht can run circles around it, and the war ends in a German victory.
Hitler bet the U-Boats could suck just enough life out of the Red Army to win on the Eastern Front, and then nothing else would matter. He was wrong.
I just never saw it as an unreasonable gamble. Getting stuck in a long war of attrition with the Soviets (with American food and supplies behind them) is a war the Germans were never going to win anyways, so Hitler went for broke on his best chance.
(4.) You may have an angle if Churchill's government had fallen. Then again, Hitler had shown himself entirely untrustworthy at Munich not too long before that. I have never found a solid consensus about if Churchill can survive a massacre at Dunkirk.
Operation Sealion was a bad idea and would have been doomed to disaster. There was a heinous battle of attrition on both sides during the Battle of Britain, but the Luftwaffe was never really close to obtaining air superiority. Neither did they have much of any anti-shipping capabilities (indeed, the failure to develop an anti-shipping bombing campaign to complement the U-Boat campaign in the Atlantic, away from organized Allied radar and fighter coverage, was a serious part of their failure in the Battle of the Atlantic) to drive off the Royal Navy. Remember the careful, meticulous preparation that went into Overlord when the Allies had air superiority and naval dominance? Trying to do the same thing the other direction into a strong air force, strong navy, and a whole lot of minefields in the English Channel would have, at best, gotten the invasion force stranded and captured, and probably something much worse than that.
Concentrate your shipping? Centralizing the targets for the bombers! Spreading them out? Makes it easy for the U-Boats to pick them off one-by-one. Introducing this dynamic into the Battle of the Atlantic puts a ton of strain on the Allies. Then again, a long-range German bomber sure would have helped against concentrated Soviet industry and refineries on the Eastern Front, but that is a conversation about another technical failure from the Germans.
Trying to do it with river barges in a notoriously feisty body of water is almost comical.
(5.) The prewar population of Moscow was on the order of 4 million. The prewar population of Stalingrad was roughly 10% of that. A vicious, street-to-street, house-to-house, urban war of attrition with winter closing in and Stalin throwing the entire kitchen at you, when the Germans were not prepared for a long winter siege and at the ragged end of a very overextended supply line, well, not sure it would have worked out perfectly for them.
I find it funny you keep bringing up German supply and manpower problems in the 1910s and I keep doing the same thing in the 1940s. Haha. I think your concluding remarks about the simple lack of numbers in both conflicts are pretty apt.
(6.) I guess I should be kind and point out a "flaw" in my idea here -- assume the Germans take Paris in 1918. You kind of have to assume that an incredible victory on the scale of the Battle of Tannenburg happens in the east, otherwise the Russians might just steamroll their way into East Prussia and eventually Berlin without much to stop them. I know the Germans lost but, considering the raw numbers, it was amazing they made it as far as they did.
(7.) I agree, the Germans were screwed after 1918. The balance of power, which was somewhat close in 1918, was tipping quickly and wildly in the Allies' favor after that point with the German economy collapsing and American arms/men pouring in.
(8.) I think any sound strategist would have seen the U-Boats in both wars as a "go for broke" short-term strategy built around winning these wars quickly, because I think we would both agree that Germany starves out in the 1910s and/or Stalin has more bodies than they do and he is willing to use them in the 1940s. I see their thinking in trying to win now.
We know what effective blockades can do. See the Confederacy in the Civil War, Germany in the Great War, and Japan in the World War. The fact the Germans were not quite able to implement it does not mean it was not worth trying given their other options.
If it all comes down to Moscow in 1941, as you seem to say is perhaps the best chance for the Germans winning the war, every convoy loss on the route to Murmansk is a little victory for your last big push to victory. Screw what happens after that because, frankly, if this does not work, then nothing else after that was going to matter anyways.
Stepping back from this for a few days but glad to return to it now.
I think our back and forth, which I did enjoy immensely, missed kind of my overall point that kicked off the conversation in the first place -- while we talked about the initial German thrust to Paris in 1914, most of our "what if" scenarios about the Great War concern 1917 and the German Spring Offensive of 1918. These were comparatively late in the war, which prompted my comment about it being a game that came down to the wire and, therefore, in its morbid way, a more interesting one than the World War, which was over early in its course.
The World War was, again, basically over by the end of 1942 with the destruction of the German Eight Army in Stalingrad, Rommel being stopped in his tracks at El Alamein with the landings for Operation Torch behind him, and the destruction of the cream of the Japanese carrier forces at the Battle of Midway that summer. Your point about the German failure to take Moscow in late 1941 only adds to my point -- your point that the failure to take Moscow was a major turning point of the war (and it was) furthers my point that the World War was over early. I have never seen anybody make even a reasonable case the Allies were worried about losing the war in spring 1945 the way they were in 1918. Things were very touch-and-go for them that spring.
Going through the points if there is something relevant to add...
(1.) I do not know how one can say the Germans did not win on the Eastern Front, defeating the Romanov regime and its successors in the process. They did this against a foe with massive numbers while needing to hold on the Western Front and help out their various incompetent allies throughout the rest of Europe. The fact Imperial Russia was a vulnerable target, full of internal instability and strife, is irrelevant. The Germans forced them out.
I would probably argue the Soviet Union in 1941 was more of a basket case (after Stalin's purges, the various show trials, force collectivization, millions dying in famines, barely able to defeat little Finland, countless political exiles, international pariah, etc.) than the Czarist regime in 1914. Stalin got his act together far better than Nicolas did, though, but I doubt you would argue that Soviet weakness in the early part of the war makes your "near victory" for them, had Germany shown more focus to take Leningrad and Moscow, any less an accomplishment.
(2.) I know this is rah-rah stuff from a commander, but every source that I have seen said the Allies were gravely worried in April 1918 about the Germans...
April 1918 is a lot closer to the end of the war than, say, November 1942 and Stalingrad.
(3.) I think the U-Boat question (in WWII) is an interesting one we cannot resolve. I just know Hitler's thoughts (and their naval leaderships' desires and intended strategies) in declaring war on the United States. Hitler rightfully knew the centerpiece of the war was the Eastern Front. Victory there would divide the planet between German and Anglo-American spheres, and even if Fortress Britain stood, there was no practical way to reconquer Europe once the Nazis have a chance to wheel and consolidate their empire, hunkering down for a long Cold War.
Unless you bring nuclear weapons into it... Not going there.
The Red Army with American supplies is more like the Red Army we know. It has trucks and fuel to move supplies, equipment, and men around. Those men are better fed and clothed, much more able to fight and move in the winter. Their officers have radios and telegraphs to communicate and coordinate with each other, and their railroad system has functioning engines and cars to move supplies on a strategic level. Without Lend-Lease, the Red Army is much more like the Russian army of the last war. It might be massive, but it is less able to fight a modern, mobile war. The Wehrmacht can run circles around it, and the war ends in a German victory.
Hitler bet the U-Boats could suck just enough life out of the Red Army to win on the Eastern Front, and then nothing else would matter. He was wrong.
I just never saw it as an unreasonable gamble. Getting stuck in a long war of attrition with the Soviets (with American food and supplies behind them) is a war the Germans were never going to win anyways, so Hitler went for broke on his best chance.
(4.) You may have an angle if Churchill's government had fallen. Then again, Hitler had shown himself entirely untrustworthy at Munich not too long before that. I have never found a solid consensus about if Churchill can survive a massacre at Dunkirk.
Operation Sealion was a bad idea and would have been doomed to disaster. There was a heinous battle of attrition on both sides during the Battle of Britain, but the Luftwaffe was never really close to obtaining air superiority. Neither did they have much of any anti-shipping capabilities (indeed, the failure to develop an anti-shipping bombing campaign to complement the U-Boat campaign in the Atlantic, away from organized Allied radar and fighter coverage, was a serious part of their failure in the Battle of the Atlantic) to drive off the Royal Navy. Remember the careful, meticulous preparation that went into Overlord when the Allies had air superiority and naval dominance? Trying to do the same thing the other direction into a strong air force, strong navy, and a whole lot of minefields in the English Channel would have, at best, gotten the invasion force stranded and captured, and probably something much worse than that.
Concentrate your shipping? Centralizing the targets for the bombers! Spreading them out? Makes it easy for the U-Boats to pick them off one-by-one. Introducing this dynamic into the Battle of the Atlantic puts a ton of strain on the Allies. Then again, a long-range German bomber sure would have helped against concentrated Soviet industry and refineries on the Eastern Front, but that is a conversation about another technical failure from the Germans.
Trying to do it with river barges in a notoriously feisty body of water is almost comical.
(5.) The prewar population of Moscow was on the order of 4 million. The prewar population of Stalingrad was roughly 10% of that. A vicious, street-to-street, house-to-house, urban war of attrition with winter closing in and Stalin throwing the entire kitchen at you, when the Germans were not prepared for a long winter siege and at the ragged end of a very overextended supply line, well, not sure it would have worked out perfectly for them.
I find it funny you keep bringing up German supply and manpower problems in the 1910s and I keep doing the same thing in the 1940s. Haha. I think your concluding remarks about the simple lack of numbers in both conflicts are pretty apt.
(6.) I guess I should be kind and point out a "flaw" in my idea here -- assume the Germans take Paris in 1918. You kind of have to assume that an incredible victory on the scale of the Battle of Tannenburg happens in the east, otherwise the Russians might just steamroll their way into East Prussia and eventually Berlin without much to stop them. I know the Germans lost but, considering the raw numbers, it was amazing they made it as far as they did.
(7.) I agree, the Germans were screwed after 1918. The balance of power, which was somewhat close in 1918, was tipping quickly and wildly in the Allies' favor after that point with the German economy collapsing and American arms/men pouring in.
(8.) I think any sound strategist would have seen the U-Boats in both wars as a "go for broke" short-term strategy built around winning these wars quickly, because I think we would both agree that Germany starves out in the 1910s and/or Stalin has more bodies than they do and he is willing to use them in the 1940s. I see their thinking in trying to win now.
We know what effective blockades can do. See the Confederacy in the Civil War, Germany in the Great War, and Japan in the World War. The fact the Germans were not quite able to implement it does not mean it was not worth trying given their other options.
If it all comes down to Moscow in 1941, as you seem to say is perhaps the best chance for the Germans winning the war, every convoy loss on the route to Murmansk is a little victory for your last big push to victory. Screw what happens after that because, frankly, if this does not work, then nothing else after that was going to matter anyways.
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I was talking about faces I saw, not the voices. Looked familiar, but saw the preview again tonight and they're not who I was thinking.
I'm curious if they'll do more of this kind of thing--dig up old footage like this, and transition it to this kind of color and HD look, or if they've done more somewhere?
Lost a Great Uncle the day before that damn war ended.
My Grandfather was a macine gunner who never talked about it. He was a hard old man who was very moody.
That one was very personal for my family.
My Grandfather was a macine gunner who never talked about it. He was a hard old man who was very moody.
That one was very personal for my family.
I've wondered if Hitler would have pushed east first if he would have sunk Russia. Would England, France,US or others have came to Stalin's aid if western Europe "not in danger".
I know Germany was led by a lunatic and one of the most heinous people to live, but their military was a machine back then.
I know Germany was led by a lunatic and one of the most heinous people to live, but their military was a machine back then.
Well, tried to catch the last showing here but it was sold out. 
Have been watching some of the YouTube week by week series suggested here. Thinking maybe I should take a look at the old book from my dad's stuff. Pretty sure it was his dad's since it was actually published before the USA even entered the war. It's a pretty sensationalized collection of articles and essays from the time period as you might ascertain from the cover!
Have been watching some of the YouTube week by week series suggested here. Thinking maybe I should take a look at the old book from my dad's stuff. Pretty sure it was his dad's since it was actually published before the USA even entered the war. It's a pretty sensationalized collection of articles and essays from the time period as you might ascertain from the cover!
Well, they went to war for Poland, and that was pretty much a prerequisite unless something radically different happened. Hard to imagine an invasion of Russia without involving Poland in some way.
Leaving that aside, I think England and France would have been pulled in due to the massive territorial gains Germany was making to the east.
I question if Chamberlain would have kept doing the alligator (let it eat others as long as it isn't me, until there are no others) approach to this. If they didn't like Russia they may have just waited to see what happens.
I think if Germany had stopped with Poland and then just taken the Austria, Czech such countries, he would have been left alone.
Poland was the catalyst for their entry into the war, so the decision making would have had to radically change from the way it happened.
My biggest what if of WWII is "What if Hitler had stayed focused on England and delayed his attack on Russia until after Peace with British Empire?"
What would have happened if Hitler would have kept war production geared towards Bombing England and the Armies that he sent into Russia would have gone into the Middle East instead? Japan just attacks England and French holdings in SE Asia. Leaving America neutral for a few more years. Germany and Japan link up in India. How much of the British Empire would have to fall before England sues for peace? After peace with England, then war with Russia.
What would have happened if Hitler would have kept war production geared towards Bombing England and the Armies that he sent into Russia would have gone into the Middle East instead? Japan just attacks England and French holdings in SE Asia. Leaving America neutral for a few more years. Germany and Japan link up in India. How much of the British Empire would have to fall before England sues for peace? After peace with England, then war with Russia.
I'd have to guess that Japanese attacks on British and French holdings would have brought us in fairly quickly. There's no doubt, though, that expansion plans anywhere other than Russia would have been harder to deal with, though I would imagine that we'd be trying to formulate an alliance with Russia if we could get it done.
And we get a second chance to see this. Returning for a one day run on January 21st in 1000 theatres. I had better buy tickets in advance this time.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life...__F4b7lmfqs3eLPJ-Tpe36ZXYrYftxtfT2tK90GeOZCf8
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life...__F4b7lmfqs3eLPJ-Tpe36ZXYrYftxtfT2tK90GeOZCf8
The Germans had three possible sources of petroleum.
-- imports from the United States (only allowed if the Royal Navy allows it)
-- Romania
-- imports from the Soviet Union
In terms of quantity, the first is by far the largest, the second is mediocre, and the third could have been considerable but obviously had temperamental management.
Annexing Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland cut off their access to the first. They had no way to defeat the Royal Navy, invade Britain, or force a British surrender, which meant that they would have to look to the other two routes no matter what.
Romanian sources were relatively secure... but, again, inadequate. Their economy was going to bog down for lack of fuel in 1942 on Romanian oil sources alone.
The last option is invade the Soviet Union.
Without a successful invasion of the Soviet Union to take the oilfields around Baku, their economy (and all of their allied/puppet states in Europe) shuts down and their modern, mechanized army and air force become useless. They revert to the same force of infantry that they had in 1918 or somewhere thereabouts. They will not win anything.
This is why (if you recall the exchange me and @herbicide had above) I am skeptical about the effectiveness of them taking Moscow in 1941 or early 1942. It would have proven a hardship for the Soviets, but they had the material, manpower, space, and fuel to yet win a war of attrition with the Germans even without Moscow on a temporary basis.
The Germans would have ruined themselves and burnt all their fuel for something worth... little to them. Nothing makes Stalin surrender without annihilation.
Taking Moscow would have been a huge cost in fuel and force for the Germans for an objective that ultimately gained them little and exposed them to massive counterattacks in the winter. This is why the southern offensive (and its culmination at Stalingrad short of the oilfields or cutting off the Volga River) is ultimately the most important battle of the war.
The flip side of this story later in the war -- once Allied air forces concentrated on the Ploesti oilfields in Romania and German refining capacity, the war ended fast.
The Germans ran out of food in 1918 and fuel in 1945.
-- imports from the United States (only allowed if the Royal Navy allows it)
-- Romania
-- imports from the Soviet Union
In terms of quantity, the first is by far the largest, the second is mediocre, and the third could have been considerable but obviously had temperamental management.
Annexing Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland cut off their access to the first. They had no way to defeat the Royal Navy, invade Britain, or force a British surrender, which meant that they would have to look to the other two routes no matter what.
Romanian sources were relatively secure... but, again, inadequate. Their economy was going to bog down for lack of fuel in 1942 on Romanian oil sources alone.
The last option is invade the Soviet Union.
Without a successful invasion of the Soviet Union to take the oilfields around Baku, their economy (and all of their allied/puppet states in Europe) shuts down and their modern, mechanized army and air force become useless. They revert to the same force of infantry that they had in 1918 or somewhere thereabouts. They will not win anything.
This is why (if you recall the exchange me and @herbicide had above) I am skeptical about the effectiveness of them taking Moscow in 1941 or early 1942. It would have proven a hardship for the Soviets, but they had the material, manpower, space, and fuel to yet win a war of attrition with the Germans even without Moscow on a temporary basis.
The Germans would have ruined themselves and burnt all their fuel for something worth... little to them. Nothing makes Stalin surrender without annihilation.
Taking Moscow would have been a huge cost in fuel and force for the Germans for an objective that ultimately gained them little and exposed them to massive counterattacks in the winter. This is why the southern offensive (and its culmination at Stalingrad short of the oilfields or cutting off the Volga River) is ultimately the most important battle of the war.
The flip side of this story later in the war -- once Allied air forces concentrated on the Ploesti oilfields in Romania and German refining capacity, the war ended fast.
The Germans ran out of food in 1918 and fuel in 1945.
Interesting Idea, I tend to lean the other way, What if Hitler had never attacked France and then England after the "phony war" during the winter of 1939/40. Instead of attacking the low countries and then France, if he would have at that moment continued East.
France was dug in behind the Maginot Line, and was not about to attack Germany from the West. Its likely that Germany could have moved east, engage Russia, with the Russians getting little or no help from France, England and America.
Hell, have Japan make a small attack or at least threaten to invade Siberia, forces Russia to keep some troops in the area to protect them from Japan.
How many hundreds of aircraft and crews did Germany lose in the battle of Britain, how many men and tanks did it lose in France and the low countries? Those men and equipment could have meant a world of a difference fighting in the East against Russia.
Its very probable that Neither France nor England would have moved against Germany from the West, hell they hated Russia almost as much as they hated Germany.
Their constraint was never really having enough weapons, vehicles, and men. Their constraint was having enough fuel and supplying it all over Soviet infrastructure.
Or, should I say, what remained after they torched everything.
They still would have been in a critical fuel situation, and with American supplies through Lend-Lease flowing into the Soviet Union unmolested by the U-Boats, the Soviets had essentially a bottomless pool of space, men, supplies, and materials. I think it ends up being inevitable the war degenerates into a long-term of attrition on the East that the Germans cannot win under any circumstances, even the one you propose of a "one-on-one" that presume the French or British never take offensive action in the west and German industrial heartland.
