(1.) Britain was running dangerously low on food and materials in early 1917, and a few months (maybe six) more of an effective U-Boat campaign would have put their viability in the war in jeopardy. Britain's political system would be less able to tolerate the privations that were common in Imperial Germany by 1917, which you rightfully point out.
Despite Germany starving by this point, they still managed large and successful offensives against the Russians and Italians in 1917. They would push the Soviets out of the war soon thereafter and reorient westward. Their offensives in 1918 scared the goodness out of the Allies, and Haig even thought they were going to lose the war for a few weeks in 1918.
Change the parameters on that U-Boat campaign only slightly, and the British might have been out of the war, and the French were completely toast on their own.
(2.) See my point above -- the "broken" Germans accomplished more in spring 1918 on the Western Front in four weeks than the Allies accomplished in four years. The French and British had nothing left in the tank; the Germans came real close to finishing them off.
(3.) I already agreed with you that, without victory in 1914, an absolute prerequisite for a Central Powers victory in a "long war" involves no American intervention, or at least one that would have delayed significant troop buildups until late 1918 or 1919. I just do not think it is that difficult to construct a slightly different series of events or a slightly more honest policy on neutrality on the part of the U.S. political leadership to see this coming to fruition.
(4.) As long as Churchill is in charge, I do not see him cutting a deal. I think, after Munich, that a hardliner like Churchill knew the value of such promises. As long as Churchill's government remains, the British stay in the war. I honestly do not know the political winds well enough at that point as to if Churchill survives the loss of the BEF. Dynamo was a propaganda boost far beyond its military value, though (many of the rescued men were French, eventually returned to France only to surrender weeks later) without a viable path to invasion or taking London, Britain was in a situation where it could not be defeated militarily by the Germans.
(5.) They could not finish off Stalingrad between August 22, 1942 and November 19, 1942 (the Soviet counteroffensive), a period of 12.5 weeks, and taking Moscow would have led to the same siege, horrendous attrition, and vicious street-to-street fighting (but maybe somehow worse). Stalin would have burnt everything behind him. I agree that delaying Barbarossa was a mistake when you know you are on the clock against the Russian Winter, but if twice your six weeks is not enough for Stalingrad, I am not sure it ultimately matters.
Taking Moscow would have been slow and painful. The Germans never really started in our reality. I am not sure they would have had enough time.
(6.) I agree -- Moscow was an incredibly important target. Losing it is a severe blow, though not the end of the war such as losing Paris in 1914 or 1918.
But see my point #5 above -- clawing it from Soviet hands would not have been easy.
(7.) I just do not see Stalin bowing out after Kursk and heading right into Bagration. He knew he had the Germans on their back foot. He could imagine the red banner flying over Berlin and Paris, and he cared not how many lives it would cost.
A mutual deal after a prolonged stalemate on the Eastern Front is conceivable, which is more or less what we got in 1918. There was not a stalemate in 1944.
(8.) I have always found this an interesting conversation. Despite their reputation, the Germans pursued very risky strategies in the Great War, starting with the two-front war itself and violating Belgian neutrality to induce the British into the war. The choice to roll with the U-Boats, in each war, was one to attempt to win the war now, quickly, or not at all.
During the Great War, as you pointed out, the British blockade was starving the Germans out. They rolled the dice to win quickly -- win or cut a deal in the east, aggressively reorient to the west, and hope the U-Boat campaign either knocks the British out of the war or at least reduces their strength, and then make your push on Paris. You know this likely means American involvement, but that might be inevitable, anyways. If your only possible path to victory is a short-term strategy, you might as well go all-in on it. They did, and they lost... barely.
In the World War, Hitler made the same gamble. American shipping and Lend-Lease was a great aid to Britain and, directly or indirectly, to the Soviets. The Red Army marched into battle often wearing American (or "British," oftentimes repackaged or substituted) clothes, eating American food, communicating on American field telephones and radios, burning American fuel, and driving American trucks. The Soviets were very dependent on railroads, as you point out, and imported locomotives and rolling stock from the U.S. to replace depreciation.
Hitler bet the U-Boats could stem the flow of American aid to the Eastern Front. If he could win there, nothing else would matter. Eventual American numbers and industrial might would matter not if he wins the war against the Soviets in late 1941 or sometime in 1942.
And as you have been arguing, he came somewhat close. Allied shipping losses in the early part of the war were absolutely staggering...
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe..._and_Neutral_Shipping_by_U-boat_Action-en.svg
There is a reason there was no second front in the west until 1944 once the Battle of the Atlantic was more-or-less won -- American material and manpower advantages were meaningless if you could not safely transport them safety to or supply them in Europe.
Once the U-Boats were handled and lines of communication to Britain and the Soviet Union were safe, you might notice the war ended rater quickly.
You were right the U-Boats were a risky strategy. But what others did they have? You either try to wind fast, or you know you are going to lose slow.
I also hold up the example of the American submarine campaign in the Pacific, which absolutely choked the Japanese economy of fuel and materials. So much of their manpower ended up wasted on distant, isolated outposts because they could not move them nor supply them due to the risk of interdiction from American submarines and, as time went on, aircraft and surface ships. That strategy might not have worked against the Allies, but it sure reduced Japan's ability to resist or carry out mobile warfare to a shadow of its former self by 1945.
Last edited:
