The Insider Information Weekly Mailbag - Questions Submission

[jcyclonee]

Huh, what is that? Been too long (TWSS)

You're not even married yet. You have no idea.

 

[cyrocksmypants]

Is it your contact in the AD that slept with the football player?

Wait, you used "it"? Is it Riley?

@GTO please make sure to include this as questions.

 

[BCClone]

This doesn't help. I have some very important teddy bear questions that I need answered in a timely manner and I'll be on Spring Break next week. I can't wait for two weeks for these answers.

Im on spring break next week also. Who the heck takes spring break this week? That’s not natural.

 

[GTO]

Im on spring break next week also. Who the heck takes spring break this week? That’s not natural.

Texas - West Virginia's pretty cousin.

 

[jcyclonee]

Im on spring break next week also. Who the heck takes spring break this week? That’s not natural.

Are you flying out of MSP or driving? You're only about an hour away. Maybe you're flying out of FDX (Fort Dodge International).

 

[BCClone]

Are you flying out of MSP or driving? You're only about an hour away. Maybe you're flying out of FDX (Fort Dodge International).

You sound like my wife now. Remember when you asked about bringing your daughter to MSP on Friday and I said my son can get up to my area Friday afternoon and then we can kick her out at the airport when we fly out that night?

 

[mdk2isu]

Are you flying out of MSP or driving? You're only about an hour away. Maybe you're flying out of FDX (Fort Dodge International).

"International"

 

[jcyclonee]

You sound like my wife now. Remember when you asked about bringing your daughter to MSP on Friday and I said my son can get up to my area Friday afternoon and then we can kick her out at the airport when we fly out that night?

That's right. Just leave her at the airport. We'll pick her up at the airport on Sunday morning. Just lend her a few bucks for a couple of meals.

 

[jcyclonee]

"International"

It's a bxxch getting through customs there.

 

[mdk2isu]

It's a bxxch getting through customs there.

You mean the one glass door and the old dude checking your ID? Real tough.

 

[jcyclonee]

You mean the one glass door and the old dude checking your ID? Real tough.

There's an old dude checking IDs now? It's even tougher than when I was last there.

 

[mdk2isu]

There's an old dude checking IDs now? It's even tougher than when I was last there.

Its been close to 10 years since I flew out of there the one time I did. But I cant imagine it's much different now.

 

[jcyclonee]

Its been close to 10 years since I flew out of there the one time I did. But I cant imagine it's much different now.

I suppose the dude is about 10 years older now.

 

[Sigmapolis]

Where was Sig for the last two weeks?

Peru and Ecuador

Since I watched the movie this weekend, what would have happened if we lost the battle of Midway? Would we only have 49 states or would we have invaded Mexico again to take one of their states?

Short as I can make this —

I read an excellent article about exactly this issue once. Summarizing its main conclusions, it probably does not matter very much in the end.

Japan could *take* Midway in a surprise attack but could not hold it long-term. Japanese logistics and industry were stretched far beyond their means in 1942, and trying to supply Midway as American submarines and air raids from Hawaii came for it ends badly for them. They intended Midway as *bait* and not a stepping stone to Hawaii proper.

There was no way for Japan to invade Hawaii (or specifically Oahu). American anti-air, land-based anti-fleet, and Army/Marine assets based there would crush anything the Japanese could have hoped to put together for a landing force, and trying to institute a blockade halfway across the Pacific from their logistical bases would have never worked.

The main point of the Midway operation for Japan was to lure American fleet carriers into battle and destroy them, but that was fool’s gold. Even if the Japanese destroy the handful of American fleet carriers, that victory is ultimately tactical and not strategic. They would be replaced quickly enough once American industry spooled up. It might have extended the war, either with Japan making more gains in the Pacific that needed to be rolled back later during the war *or* because the U.S. had to send more resources to the Pacific in 1942 and 1943, which would have slowed down things in Europe, but nothing Allied production advantages cannot overcome.

Roughly 90% of U.S. war production was going to Europe in 1942 and early 1943 even as the Japanese were still making forward progress in the South Pacific. We just did not care that much. We knew the Japanese economy could not compete with ours when we eventually focused on them. Defeating Germany (mostly through aiding the Soviets on the Eastern Front) was the priority from the start.

Eventually, American industrial might swamps the Japanese, and the war proceeds much as it did otherwise though maybe takes a year or so longer to undo Japanese gains. It probably still involves island hopping (either through the East Indies and Central Pacific, like in reality, or perhaps down from Alaska, which was considered a viable alternative by Nimitz if it ended up the “shortest route”) to the point where you can isolate the Japanese homeland from their resource areas to the south, at which point you have the same conundrum about using the bomb.

The Battle of Midway was an incredible tactical and strategic victory for the U.S., without a doubt, but it mostly shortened the war rather than saved the U.S. from defeat. The Japanese strike force of the six fleet carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor was dead one way or another at some point, however. They could not possibly “trade” in an efficient enough manner to overcome American industrial might. Once they are gone, one way or another, the war follows the familiar pattern of how it actually went.

Japan’s whole strategy from the start was to bloody the American nose, somehow cause us to think it was “not worth it,” and acknowledge their hegemony in East Asia. Their strategy (and only some of theirs, Yamamoto was saying the whole time this was foolish) was entirely wishful thinking. As we know about the “Sleeping Giant” and our anger over Pearl Harbor, we were not having any of that. I doubt losing a few old flattops at Midway destroys American resolve. If anything, I imagine, it just hardens it further. We would have worn them down eventually somehow.

 

[BCClone]

Peru and Ecuador



Short as I can make this —

I read an excellent article about exactly this issue once. Summarizing its main conclusions, it probably does not matter very much in the end.

Japan could *take* Midway in a surprise attack but could not hold it long-term. Japanese logistics and industry were stretched far beyond their means in 1942, and trying to supply Midway as American submarines and air raids from Hawaii came for it ends badly for them. They intended Midway as *bait* and not a stepping stone to Hawaii proper.

There was no way for Japan to invade Hawaii (or specifically Oahu). American anti-air, land-based anti-fleet, and Army/Marine assets based there would crush anything the Japanese could have hoped to put together for a landing force, and trying to institute a blockade halfway across the Pacific from their logistical bases would have never worked.

The main point of the Midway operation for Japan was to lure American fleet carriers into battle and destroy them, but that was fool’s gold. Even if the Japanese destroy the handful of American fleet carriers, that victory is ultimately tactical and not strategic. They would be replaced quickly enough once American industry spooled up. It might have extended the war, either with Japan making more gains in the Pacific that needed to be rolled back later during the war *or* because the U.S. had to send more resources to the Pacific in 1942 and 1943, which would have slowed down things in Europe, but nothing Allied production advantages cannot overcome.

Roughly 90% of U.S. war production was going to Europe in 1942 and early 1943 even as the Japanese were still making forward progress in the South Pacific. We just did not care that much. We knew the Japanese economy could not compete with ours when we eventually focused on them. Defeating Germany (mostly through aiding the Soviets on the Eastern Front) was the priority from the start.

Eventually, American industrial might swamps the Japanese, and the war proceeds much as it did otherwise though maybe takes a year or so longer to undo Japanese gains. It probably still involves island hopping (either through the East Indies and Central Pacific, like in reality, or perhaps down from Alaska, which was considered a viable alternative by Nimitz if it ended up the “shortest route”) to the point where you can isolate the Japanese homeland from their resource areas to the south, at which point you have the same conundrum about using the bomb.

The Battle of Midway was an incredible tactical and strategic victory for the U.S., without a doubt, but it mostly shortened the war rather than saved the U.S. from defeat. The Japanese strike force of the six fleet carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor was dead one way or another at some point, however. They could not possibly “trade” in an efficient enough manner to overcome American industrial might. Once they are gone, one way or another, the war follows the familiar pattern of how it actually went.

Japan’s whole strategy from the start was to bloody the American nose, somehow cause us to think it was “not worth it,” and acknowledge their hegemony in East Asia. Their strategy (and only some of theirs, Yamamoto was saying the whole time this was foolish) was entirely wishful thinking. As we know about the “Sleeping Giant” and our anger over Pearl Harbor, we were not having any of that. I doubt losing a few old flattops at Midway destroys American resolve. If anything, I imagine, it just hardens it further?. We would have worn them down eventually somehow.

There’s a question in there @GTO and @cyrocksmypants You need to answer it.

 

[Doc]

What would you say your "brand" is?

 

[cyrocksmypants]

Peru and Ecuador



Short as I can make this —

I read an excellent article about exactly this issue once. Summarizing its main conclusions, it probably does not matter very much in the end.

Japan could *take* Midway in a surprise attack but could not hold it long-term. Japanese logistics and industry were stretched far beyond their means in 1942, and trying to supply Midway as American submarines and air raids from Hawaii came for it ends badly for them. They intended Midway as *bait* and not a stepping stone to Hawaii proper.

There was no way for Japan to invade Hawaii (or specifically Oahu). American anti-air, land-based anti-fleet, and Army/Marine assets based there would crush anything the Japanese could have hoped to put together for a landing force, and trying to institute a blockade halfway across the Pacific from their logistical bases would have never worked.

The main point of the Midway operation for Japan was to lure American fleet carriers into battle and destroy them, but that was fool’s gold. Even if the Japanese destroy the handful of American fleet carriers, that victory is ultimately tactical and not strategic. They would be replaced quickly enough once American industry spooled up. It might have extended the war, either with Japan making more gains in the Pacific that needed to be rolled back later during the war *or* because the U.S. had to send more resources to the Pacific in 1942 and 1943, which would have slowed down things in Europe, but nothing Allied production advantages cannot overcome.

Roughly 90% of U.S. war production was going to Europe in 1942 and early 1943 even as the Japanese were still making forward progress in the South Pacific. We just did not care that much. We knew the Japanese economy could not compete with ours when we eventually focused on them. Defeating Germany (mostly through aiding the Soviets on the Eastern Front) was the priority from the start.

Eventually, American industrial might swamps the Japanese, and the war proceeds much as it did otherwise though maybe takes a year or so longer to undo Japanese gains. It probably still involves island hopping (either through the East Indies and Central Pacific, like in reality, or perhaps down from Alaska, which was considered a viable alternative by Nimitz if it ended up the “shortest route”) to the point where you can isolate the Japanese homeland from their resource areas to the south, at which point you have the same conundrum about using the bomb.

The Battle of Midway was an incredible tactical and strategic victory for the U.S., without a doubt, but it mostly shortened the war rather than saved the U.S. from defeat. The Japanese strike force of the six fleet carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor was dead one way or another at some point, however. They could not possibly “trade” in an efficient enough manner to overcome American industrial might. Once they are gone, one way or another, the war follows the familiar pattern of how it actually went.

Japan’s whole strategy from the start was to bloody the American nose, somehow cause us to think it was “not worth it,” and acknowledge their hegemony in East Asia. Their strategy (and only some of theirs, Yamamoto was saying the whole time this was foolish) was entirely wishful thinking. As we know about the “Sleeping Giant” and our anger over Pearl Harbor, we were not having any of that. I doubt losing a few old flattops at Midway destroys American resolve. If anything, I imagine, it just hardens it further. We would have worn them down eventually somehow.

Lol, miss you Sig.

 

[Sigmapolis]

Lol, miss you Sig.

<3

 

[jcyclonee]

Peru and Ecuador



Short as I can make this —

I read an excellent article about exactly this issue once. Summarizing its main conclusions, it probably does not matter very much in the end.

Japan could *take* Midway in a surprise attack but could not hold it long-term. Japanese logistics and industry were stretched far beyond their means in 1942, and trying to supply Midway as American submarines and air raids from Hawaii came for it ends badly for them. They intended Midway as *bait* and not a stepping stone to Hawaii proper.

There was no way for Japan to invade Hawaii (or specifically Oahu). American anti-air, land-based anti-fleet, and Army/Marine assets based there would crush anything the Japanese could have hoped to put together for a landing force, and trying to institute a blockade halfway across the Pacific from their logistical bases would have never worked.

The main point of the Midway operation for Japan was to lure American fleet carriers into battle and destroy them, but that was fool’s gold. Even if the Japanese destroy the handful of American fleet carriers, that victory is ultimately tactical and not strategic. They would be replaced quickly enough once American industry spooled up. It might have extended the war, either with Japan making more gains in the Pacific that needed to be rolled back later during the war *or* because the U.S. had to send more resources to the Pacific in 1942 and 1943, which would have slowed down things in Europe, but nothing Allied production advantages cannot overcome.

Roughly 90% of U.S. war production was going to Europe in 1942 and early 1943 even as the Japanese were still making forward progress in the South Pacific. We just did not care that much. We knew the Japanese economy could not compete with ours when we eventually focused on them. Defeating Germany (mostly through aiding the Soviets on the Eastern Front) was the priority from the start.

Eventually, American industrial might swamps the Japanese, and the war proceeds much as it did otherwise though maybe takes a year or so longer to undo Japanese gains. It probably still involves island hopping (either through the East Indies and Central Pacific, like in reality, or perhaps down from Alaska, which was considered a viable alternative by Nimitz if it ended up the “shortest route”) to the point where you can isolate the Japanese homeland from their resource areas to the south, at which point you have the same conundrum about using the bomb.

The Battle of Midway was an incredible tactical and strategic victory for the U.S., without a doubt, but it mostly shortened the war rather than saved the U.S. from defeat. The Japanese strike force of the six fleet carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor was dead one way or another at some point, however. They could not possibly “trade” in an efficient enough manner to overcome American industrial might. Once they are gone, one way or another, the war follows the familiar pattern of how it actually went.

Japan’s whole strategy from the start was to bloody the American nose, somehow cause us to think it was “not worth it,” and acknowledge their hegemony in East Asia. Their strategy (and only some of theirs, Yamamoto was saying the whole time this was foolish) was entirely wishful thinking. As we know about the “Sleeping Giant” and our anger over Pearl Harbor, we were not having any of that. I doubt losing a few old flattops at Midway destroys American resolve. If anything, I imagine, it just hardens it further. We would have worn them down eventually somehow.

Good answer. However, where are the charts and graphs? Also, there's barely any statistics in here. I can understand almost this whole post.

 

[SpokaneCY]

How big is the container?

It's not the size of the container, it's how long you can work the spoon back and forth.

Semi-solid sexual innuendo right there.