This is my “free will defense†response post. I had a nice long (through #2) response typed up and I lost it somehow, so this one is getting typed up in Word…grr. Anyways, this is where things get interesting. Here are some responses to the “free will defense.â€
1. An all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God (which I’m just going to call a tri-omni God from now on) could have created a world in which everyone freely chose to do the right thing. A common definition of all-powerfulness is having the ability to actualize any possible world. A possible world is one in which there are no logical contradictions. Thus a world in which there is a rock to heavy for God to lift is not a possible world. As there is no contradiction in a world in which everyone freely chooses to do the right thing, then a tri-omni God could have created such a world.
Some philosophers have attempted to draw a distinction between “logically possible†worlds and “actualizable†worlds. Their reasons are rather weak though for why a world in which everyone freely chooses to do the right thing is not actualizable.
2. Another argument is that the existence of a tri-omni God precludes the existence of free will. Here’s the argument in premise/conclusion form:
A.A tri-omni God knows everything perfectly, and hence perfectly knows, and cannot be wrong about, the future.
B.If the future is perfectly known then events can only unfold in one way, because for them to unfold otherwise would mean God was wrong.
C.In order for there to be free will it must be possible for someone to choose in more than one way.
D.Therefore, if there is a tri-omni God there is no free will because it would only be possible for people to chose in one way, that known by God.
This argument has plagued apologists for centuries and led Boethius and later Aquinas to conclude that God must be outside of time. This solution doesn’t work though because it would imply a static theory of time, from which similar conclusions can be drawn. William Lane Craig has taken a different approach to this problem, which as far as I can tell amounts to backwards causation.
3. The above arguments aren’t even the best ones IMO. My favorite comes from the nature of causation. If you are familiar with the theory of causal determinism this argument will sound familiar to you. However, I will also contend that the falsity of causal determinism doesn’t help the cause for free will either. The argument starts with the basic premise that:
A.For any event, there are either sufficient conditions to bring it about, or there are not sufficient conditions to bring it about.
An event is defined as any change over time. The above premise is necessarily true as it is of the form of “A or not A.†If there are sufficient conditions to bring about an event then that event must happen. If there are not sufficient conditions to bring about an event then it is at least partially uncaused. Either of these is rather damning to the case for free will.
If there are sufficient conditions to bring about every event (which would include a choice or action) then it would not be possible for anything to happen other than it does. Every action would be determined, thus why this theory is called determinism. On this worldview, one could also trace the responsibility for anything that happens back to God, as he would have been the one to set everything in motion. (Although if this theory is pursued to its logical conclusion even God’s actions would be determined.)
On the flip side, if there are not sufficient conditions for an event to occur, and yet it still does, then it was at least partially uncaused. Why did it happen? Who knows? The event just sort of randomly occurred. This is not to say that events of that type are not statistically predictable though (some theories of quantum mechanics would take this view). So, if an event (read choice) occurs without cause how exactly is that any more “free†than one which is determined? Additionally, how is it exactly that God would hold a person responsible for a choice that just randomly happened to be the way it was. Essentially, that person just got unlucky. Additionally, what about a world in which there is randomness would appeal to God such that he would create it that way?
4. This isn’t another argument, but I’ve given this whole spiel against “free will†and never defined it. In order to really discuss it I think free will needs to be defined. I usually say “Tell me what free will is and I will tell you whether or not we have it.†I think people’s intuition will attribute free will to someone who is unconstrained by outside forces (e.g. under the power of hypnosis or has a gun to their head) The way it is usually used by apologists is basically “that thing that shifts responsibility away from God and onto us.†Without more though, its not enough.