Lion Air Plane Crash

I’m surprised there hasn’t been more of a discussion of this on here since the Ethiopian crash. I’ve have second hand information of leaked flight recorder info on that one and would say the crash was caused by about 10% design/equipment failure and 90% pilot error. There is always a chain of events that lead to a crash and it appears the failed AOA gauge did lead to a erroneous MCAS input that started the sequence of events. I agree it is stupid to use one input when two are available, but that only contributed to what happened it did not cause it. Easily fixed. The most critical factor was the flight crew became distracted and never reduced take off thrust. They also did not know how to respond to a jammed stabilizer trim due to load forces from being grossly out of trim. They were in a gradual climb most the flight and reached speeds over twice the normal speed a 737 would fly. About 30 seconds before the crash the crew re-engaged the MCAS and tried to trim nose up which they were able to do a little. The MCAS gave a nose down input and the yoke was violently pulled back. (All previous inputs required were relatively modest). At this point something in the stabilizer/elevator mechanically failed causing a loss of all control. Further yoke inputs had no effect.

I know probably 100’s of pilots who fly 737s and none I’ve spoken to are the least bit worried about the MAX. I myself would fly one tomorrow if they were not grounded. This should be a quick fix if not for the politics.


In this comment, are you referring to the Indonesian flight, or the Ethiopian flight? And, can you link to an article going over that? (or is it too "inside?")
 
I’m surprised there hasn’t been more of a discussion of this on here since the Ethiopian crash. I’ve have second hand information of leaked flight recorder info on that one and would say the crash was caused by about 10% design/equipment failure and 90% pilot error. There is always a chain of events that lead to a crash and it appears the failed AOA gauge did lead to a erroneous MCAS input that started the sequence of events. I agree it is stupid to use one input when two are available, but that only contributed to what happened it did not cause it. Easily fixed. The most critical factor was the flight crew became distracted and never reduced take off thrust. They also did not know how to respond to a jammed stabilizer trim due to load forces from being grossly out of trim. They were in a gradual climb most the flight and reached speeds over twice the normal speed a 737 would fly. About 30 seconds before the crash the crew re-engaged the MCAS and tried to trim nose up which they were able to do a little. The MCAS gave a nose down input and the yoke was violently pulled back. (All previous inputs required were relatively modest). At this point something in the stabilizer/elevator mechanically failed causing a loss of all control. Further yoke inputs had no effect.

I know probably 100’s of pilots who fly 737s and none I’ve spoken to are the least bit worried about the MAX. I myself would fly one tomorrow if they were not grounded. This should be a quick fix if not for the politics.


r u saying their are too many computers in the machine
 

He is correct that it was an oversight to only have one of the available AOA inputs fed into the MCAS, almost everything else is written at the understanding level of a Cessna 172 pilot with many inaccuracies including how the MCAS functions.

Preliminary lion Air Report if interested. Bottom line is this crew actually flew a better jet than the eligibly better trained Ethiopian crew. They just failed to turn off the trim. The service bulletins released by the FAA in November after this crash and before the Ethiopian crash absolutely should have prevented the Ethiopian crash.


https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/28/indonesian-authorities-release-preliminary-lion-air-crash-report/
 

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