Where's everyone coming from

What is your religious background?

  • Practicing Christian

    Votes: 155 58.9%
  • Acknowledging Christian

    Votes: 60 22.8%
  • Jewish

    Votes: 3 1.1%
  • Atheist

    Votes: 23 8.7%
  • Muslim

    Votes: 2 0.8%
  • Other

    Votes: 20 7.6%

  • Total voters
    263
I don't know where your beliefs fall on time, but this special relativity theory would seem to contradict the idea of "sufficient conditions". If events can only occur if sufficient conditions occur, then two worlds starting at exactly the same position (i.e. with the same conditions) can lead to only one unique future outcome. In this model there are no possible alternate futures.
I don't really have firm beliefs about the nature of time, so you could say I truly am an agnostic in this regard. I'm not sure how special relativity would contradict the "sufficient conditions" (determinism) theory and didn't track your argument very well in this respect.
 
This argument seems to assume that every choice we make comes from one of two possible situations, 1) a set of "sufficient conditions" under which there will be only one possible choice, or 2) a random condition. I would argue there's a third situation: 3) situations where we have more than one choice (possibly an infinite number). The question becomes if we make a choice in this situation, why did we make the choice we made? Where does that choice come from? I would argue this is our soul.
I think you are very right in noticing that the question is "why did we make the choice that we did." One way to answer that question is that there were sufficient conditions to cause that choice to be made, or that it resulted partly from random chance. Your "third option" is not distinct from the previous two.

It is fine to insert a soul or whatever as the primary decision making entity. The question is simply "Why did the soul make the choice it did?" My argument applies equally as well in that situation as it would in a purely materialistic world.

If someone is choosing whether to accept a new job or whether to start a family, their decision may be largely influenced on the surrounding set of conditions, but there is still a choice being made that is separate from the these conditions. Same goes for moral decisions.
If a decision is only "largely influenced" by some conditions then those conditions are not sufficient for that choice to be made. This then begs the question of "Why did the person make the choice they did?" To answer this question you can either add to the previously mentioned conditions until they become sufficient, or you can say that there were not sufficient conditions for the choice to be made. In the later case that would mean that the decision was at least partially uncaused.

If all of our choices are made due to "sufficient conditions" or random conditions, then we hold no responsibility for our actions. Why should a man that commits an armed robbery be punished if his choices were based on sufficient conditions?
A common notion is that if someone did not have acted otherwise than they did then they are not responsible for their actions. If this premise is accepted then the answer is that people are not responsible for their actions. However, it can also be argued that someone is responsible for what they cause. In this sense someone is responsible for their actions in the same sense that my car is responsible for producing exhaust. I don't really care how the word is defined as this is just arguing over semantics.

Even if we don't consider someone to be responsible for their actions based on this argument, it still makes sense for us to act as though they are. By doing so we influence future actions of both the actor and others (e.g. deter destructive behavior). This provides the answer to your question about why we should hold someone responsible for armed robbery. As a society we have an interest in preventing armed robbery. It therefore makes sense to punish those who do that act so as to deter them and others from doing similar things later on, and to physically prevent repeat offenses. In a nutshell, my position is that it makes sense to punish when it is justified by the consequences.
 
What is this "free will" you speak of? How would you lack it in a world where everyone chose the way God wanted them to?

If we only act the way God wants us to, how is this free will? Perhaps you have a different definition than I, but to me if an external force (e.g. God) determines our choices, then this is not free will.
 
I think you are very right in noticing that the question is "why did we make the choice that we did." One way to answer that question is that there were sufficient conditions to cause that choice to be made, or that it resulted partly from random chance. Your "third option" is not distinct from the previous two.

It is fine to insert a soul or whatever as the primary decision making entity. The question is simply "Why did the soul make the choice it did?" My argument applies equally as well in that situation as it would in a purely materialistic world.

If a decision is only "largely influenced" by some conditions then those conditions are not sufficient for that choice to be made. This then begs the question of "Why did the person make the choice they did?" To answer this question you can either add to the previously mentioned conditions until they become sufficient, or you can say that there were not sufficient conditions for the choice to be made. In the later case that would mean that the decision was at least partially uncaused.

I don't think I'm doing a good job of expressing my views on this. I'm having a hard time putting my thoughts into words. I understand this idea of "sufficient conditions", but why is it contradictory to have some of these conditions within our conscious control.

Also, is this argument against free-will independent from the argument against a tri-omni God?
 
If we only act the way God wants us to, how is this free will?
I find it a little hard to believe just about anything could happen which is not the will of a tri-omni God that created the universe. In that case we would only be acting the way God wanted us to now. The only other option I can see is that God somehow created a universe in which things just randomly occur without cause, which doesn't help the case for free will any.

Perhaps you have a different definition than I, but to me if an external force (e.g. God) determines our choices, then this is not free will.
Like I mentioned earlier, my position is that if you can tell me what free will is then I will tell you whether or not we have it. I don't believe "free will" is a particular property or aspect of the world that we are just seeking to discover. I think it is a vague human-invented concept that people are seeking to impose on the world. However, if one closely examines the possible ways the world can be it is discovered that none of them jive well with our intuitions about free will. Additionally, no concept of free will can be concocted that is consistent with a way that the world can be and which would shift responsibility for our actions away from God and onto us.
 
I don't think I'm doing a good job of expressing my views on this. I'm having a hard time putting my thoughts into words. I understand this idea of "sufficient conditions", but why is it contradictory to have some of these conditions within our conscious control.
Consciousness is a complex thing, but not fundamentally different from other things in that its actions need causes, and there can be sufficient causes for conscious actions or not. The conscious control you speak of means primarily that we have thought about stuff during our decision making process. This would not change the determinedness of that process or the resulting decision.

Also, is this argument against free-will independent from the argument against a tri-omni God?
It can easily be independent of any argument about God. However, that is where free will arguments tend to come up.
 
I find it a little hard to believe just about anything could happen which is not the will of a tri-omni God that created the universe. In that case we would only be acting the way God wanted us to now. The only other option I can see is that God somehow created a universe in which things just randomly occur without cause, which doesn't help the case for free will any.

It seems to me that you're saying that if there is a tri-omni God then there are only two ways for actions to take place. Either they are the will of God or they are random. Why is it not possible that God has given Man the gift of free will and chosen to stay out of our way?
 
It seems to me that you're saying that if there is a tri-omni God then there are only two ways for actions to take place. Either they are the will of God or they are random. Why is it not possible that God has given Man the gift of free will and chosen to stay out of our way?
It is a dichotomy. There really are only the two options I've been discussing. The "3rd option" you are proposing must fall within one of those two options. Again, just what is this free will you speak of? It cannot be defined in such a way as to create a third option.