The Vietnam War by Ken Burns on PBS

Tazzels2Fers

New Member
Aug 31, 2017
24
25
3
52
Roger Trinquier is the author of Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency

He was a French Officer who fought successfully against the Viet Minh in the French - Indochina War.

Modern Warfare[edit]
Trinquier is a theorist on the style of warfare he called Modern Warfare, an "interlocking system of actions – political, economic, psychological, military – which aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime." (Modern Warfare, Ch. 2). He was critical of the traditional army's inability to adapt to this new kind of warfare. These tactics included the use of small and mobile commando teams, torture, the setting-up of self-defense forces recruited in the local population, and their forced relocation in camps, as well as psychological and educational operations.

Perhaps his most original contribution was his study and application of terrorism and torture as it related to this Modern Warfare. He argued that it was immoral to treat terrorists as criminals, and to hold them criminally liable for their acts. In his view terrorists should be treated as soldiers, albeit with the qualification that while they may attack civilian targets and wear no uniform, they also must be tortured for the very specific purpose of betraying their organization. Trinquier's criteria for torture was that the terrorist was to be asked only questions that related to the organization of his movement, that the interrogators must know what to ask, and that once the information is obtained the torture must stop and the terrorist is then treated as any other prisoner of war. (See Chapter 4 of Modern Warfare).

The French Army applied Trinquier's tactics during the Algerian War. In the short run these tactics resulted in a decisive victory in the Battle of Algiers.[2] These tactics were exposed by the press, with little or no effect at the time, as they were generally regarded as a necessary evil. In the longer term the debate on the tactics used, particularly torture, would re-emerge in the French press for decades to come (with the trial of Paul Aussaresses).
 

Tazzels2Fers

New Member
Aug 31, 2017
24
25
3
52
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clear_and_hold

Clear and Hold Strategy Against Counter Insurgency

General Abrams implemented the Clear and Hold Strategy more successfully after succeeding Westmoreland in 1968 in Vietnam. Westmoreland implemented a less successfully Search and Destroy Strategy. Abrams was fighting an uphill battle at that point with the American public starting to turn against the war. South Vietnam also lacked a strong central leader after the successful and brutal coup against the S. Vietnam President Diem at the end of 1963 - which the USA allowed to happen by telling the Generals behind the coup attempt that the USA would not interfere with the assassination of President Diem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Dinh_Diem

The Clear and Hold Strategy Against Counter Insurgency was development by the British Officer Sir Robert Thompson in Malayan from 1948 to 1960.

Sir Robert Thompson was a key advisor to the South Vietnam and was attempting to implement the Clear and Hold Strategy against the North Vietnam insurgency. President Diem and President Kennedy both backed the tactics of Sir Robert Thompson. The US Military for the most part did not.
 

Tazzels2Fers

New Member
Aug 31, 2017
24
25
3
52
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Grainger_Ker_Thompson

Sir Robert Thompson - British Military Officer

Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaysia and Vietnam[edit]
Certain principles of counter-insurgency warfare are well known since the 1950s and 1960s. The widely distributed and influential work of Sir Robert Thompson offers several such guidelines. Thompson's underlying assumption is that of a country minimally committed to the rule of law and better governance.

Elements of Thompson's moderate approach are adapted here:[6]

  1. The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted.
  2. There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision.
  3. Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision.
  4. Economy of force. The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counterinsurgency- the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.[7]
  5. Big unit action may sometimes be necessary. If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
  6. Aggressive mobility. Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue and fix insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
  7. Ground level embedding and integration. In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Program) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam like the Green Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces.[8] The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s,[9] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001,[10] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.[11][12] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses.[7]
  8. Cultural sensitivity.
  9. Systematic intelligence effort. .
  10. Methodical clear and hold. An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
  11. Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units. Mass forces include village self-defense groups and citizen militias organized for community defense and can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups.
  12. The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used. Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the toll of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war-weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.
  13. Time. A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognize when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.
 

arobb

Well-Known Member
Jan 4, 2014
1,407
2,527
113
Bump. The series picks back up again tonight. Should be pretty intense with tonight's episode covering the Tet offensive.
 

BoxsterCy

Moderator
Staff member
Sep 14, 2009
43,803
40,379
113
Minnesota
And after tonight the Nixon apologists should be a little quieter. I'll give them a pass as not being old enough or informed enough (or just ideologically blind) to know how Nixon conspired with a foreign government to sabotage peace talks to get himself an advantage in a close election.
 

BoxsterCy

Moderator
Staff member
Sep 14, 2009
43,803
40,379
113
Minnesota
Weird they didn't address mi lai massacre yet since it was in spring '68.

Did not become public till late in 1969 when I was a freshman at ISU . Summer of 1970 was when I stopped listening to late night "Beaker Street" on KAAY which was a clear 100k watt station after dark. They were hawking Free Lt. Calley t-shirts. I was all "**** that ****". Click.
 

madguy30

Well-Known Member
Nov 15, 2011
50,163
46,987
113
Weird they didn't address mi lai massacre yet since it was in spring '68.

Saw a doc on that once.

The main thing I remember from that is it was a night class, and I had plans to go out or something, and I was too sickened to even consider it.
 

dafarmer

Well-Known Member
Mar 17, 2012
5,758
5,452
113
SW Iowa
Was on campus at the time of the protests and was laid up with and injured leg, so I didn't get out to watch or participate in either sides sparring. After the first episode, it has been hard to watch. I knew relatives and friends who never made it home alive. I talked to some vets today who haven't watched any of it, and some who watched the first episode only. Their regrets are with our government and military brass lying to them and the American people about the screw up about us being bogged down in an unwinnable cesspool.
 
  • Friendly
Reactions: cyclones500

KnappShack

Well-Known Member
SuperFanatic
SuperFanatic T2
May 26, 2008
20,251
26,083
113
Parts Unknown
And after tonight the Nixon apologists should be a little quieter. I'll give them a pass as not being old enough or informed enough (or just ideologically blind) to know how Nixon conspired with a foreign government to sabotage peace talks to get himself an advantage in a close election.

Nixon was a complex guy with many layers. Unfortunately a-hole was a big part of who he was
 

BoxsterCy

Moderator
Staff member
Sep 14, 2009
43,803
40,379
113
Minnesota
Nixon was a complex guy with many layers. Unfortunately a-hole was a big part of who he was

True this. Lying unethical lawless POS on the political side yet had some worthy goals like toning down the cold war and reaching out to China. Hell, he created the EPA that Republicans are now trying to dismantle. He even signed Title IX, something I doubt any current Republican would do. I hated the man with a passion but watching his resignation speech live was a pretty sad affair. He had to go but it was bad for the country that we had arrived at a point where a president had to be removed. And that time his conspiring to sabotage the peace talks wasn't even known publicly.
 

cowgirl836

Well-Known Member
Sep 3, 2009
47,310
34,916
113
this Vietnam thing is showing me just how much we repeat ourselves. And just how little I knew about that period of history. JFC, opening fire on our own students.

58% found the killings justified?! Holy ******* hell.

And all of this for what. All of this for what.
 
  • Friendly
Reactions: bawbie

cowgirl836

Well-Known Member
Sep 3, 2009
47,310
34,916
113
If you have PBS app you can stream any that have aired to that point. (I also noticed it's available on Amazon Prime)... PBS on regular TV was showing previous part each night, following new episode, I'm not sure if they've continued that or not. .... I'm not the best source.


they have, I got home late and am rewatching the beginning right now.
 

Latest posts

Help Support Us

Become a patron